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Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00760160001-8

24 July 1964

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

> CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*France: De Gaulle's major aim in his press conference yesterday was to proclaim France's intention to pursue 'what an independent European policy could and should be."

Implicit in his frank expression of disappointment over the current impasse in the European unity movement was an appeal over the heads of the neighboring governments to the people of Europe to rally to his concept of a loose confederation of nation-states.

His customary restricted endorsement of the Atlantic alliance was overshadowed by a forceful exposition of his belief that Europe must play a greatly expanded role in the alliance and in world affairs. He apparently intends to initiate policies his European partners should feel obliged to support.

To bolster his claim to independent initiative, De Gaulle presented France's nuclear strike force developments in the most favorable light possible. His intent seemed to be as much to silence French critics of the cost of the program as to impress France's European allies.

While he specifically enlarged the scope of his call for a Geneva-type conference on Southeast Asia to include Cambodia and Vietnam as well as Laos, he clearly indicated that the decisions should be made by the big powers concerned. He insinuated France into the picture by citing the four major powers bearing a direct responsibility "in the past and present fate of

Vietnam." His specific recommendation in this regard is for the US, the USSR, and China to follow France's example and withdraw.

It is questionable whether he seriously intends to follow through on his proposal to participate in an expanded aid program for 'Indochina as a whole.' Any increase in France's current aid program there would impose strains on the French budget which he could relieve only by cutting French commitments elsewhere.

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DAILY BRIEF

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South Vietnam: Frictions among South Vietnam's leaders are continuing.

Vice Premier Hoan apparently is trying to develop a mass personal following out of the progovernment political organization he recently formed.

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stated that he hopes to develop it into a political factor carrying as much weight as the army, and that he hopes to be able to command attention from "the Americans" in six months.

Chief of state General Minh recently told Ambassador Taylor that Premier Khanh had criticized some of his speeches in the provinces for undercutting Khanh's "march to the north" theme. Minh voiced doubt that Khanh would cooperate with him in devising a less provocative line to foster national unity.

Two of the recently released generals of Minh's short-lived junta, Tran Van Don and Le Van Kim, are said to have voiced concern over the lack of enthusiasm for the war effort among military officers.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Poland: Rehearsals for the Warsaw military parade of 22 July indicate that Poland is presently receiving a wider variety of advanced Soviet military equipment than any other satellite.

Major items seen for the first time in Polish hands included 13 Scud (150-nautical-mile) surface-to-surface guided missiles, 5 MIG-21D (Fishbed) all-weather fighters, and 6 SU-7 (Fitter) ground-support fighters. Several FROG short-range rockets were also shown, the first time these have publicly appeared in any satellite army.

The availability of the FROG, Scud and Fitter, all capable of delivering nuclear weapons, gives the Poles a wider range of delivery system options than Moscow is known to have furnished to any other satellite. There is no evidence that the USSR has given nuclear warheads to Poland.

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| | 1964 | 1963 | 11767 | for 1964 |
| Industrial Production | 7.5 | 8.5 | 10 | 8.2-8. 5 |
| Labor Productivity in Industry | 4: | 6 | 6 | 4.6 |
| State-directed Investments | 1 j | 4 | 10 | 10.8 |
| State-directed Investments Chemical Industry Fertilizer | 4 | 17 | 17 | 16.6166 |
| Fentilizer | 23.4 | 13 | 9 | 28 |
| Stee | 6 | 5 | 7.7 | 4.7. |
| Electric Power | 4 13 | 13 | 13 | 10,9 |
| Petroleum: | | | 12 | 7,8 |
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USSR: The TASS summary of the mid-year economic report indicates that the Soviet economy's performance in the second quarter of this year was below the mediocre results achieved in the first quarter.

The summary also shows continued failure to reverse poor results in the major sectors of the economy during the past several years, and indicates that the new priorities accorded the chemical industry and agriculture have compounded Moscow's problems. Industrial production and labor productivity are below the rates necessary to achieve the present 1964-65 plan. The Soviets had anticipated, however, that growth in 1964 would be lower than in 1965.

The rate of investment is still less than half that required to fulfill the 1964 plan and far short of the annual increases of 12.5% or better registered in the 1950s. The impressive growth in allocations to the priority sectors of chemicals and agriculture, 37% and 19% respectively, nevertheless falls short of 1964 projections.

Consumer goods continue deficient in both quantity and quality. Although meat production fell by 18% in the first half of 1964, sales show a slight rise. This results from last year's distress slaughtering which produced a temporary increase in stocks.

The report claims that housing construction improved slightly over the first half of 1963. No figures for light industry are given but the report states its growth this year was unfavorably affected by last year's crop failure.

NOTE

Iran-Iraq: Approximately 700 members of the militant, leftist Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), including the top leadership, have fled from Iraq to Iran.

The refugees are being interned and will not be returned to Iraq. This greatly erodes KDP strength, leaving control of the Iraqi Kurds largely in the hands of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who currently is cooperating with the Baghdad regime.

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DAILY BRIEF

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THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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